The Unity of Being
Part II Section 8
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Section 8
The Implications of Quality
Thesis: Not only has every entity a nature or quality, but every quality has itself a nature, i.e., requires to be specified in its determinate difference from all other qualities by means of a further universal. In the end, since we cannot intuit every member of an infinite regress, we must be aware of one Quality which stands as the measure off all qualitative differences, a standard known only through itself while all else is known through it.
Argument 1. The nature of an entity cannot rationally be regarded as in simple identity with that entity — as a bare unity or “it.” For then the only nature the thing can have is just to be itself — and this leaves it in a relation of precise similarity with every other entity. Every entity is itself. At most one could hold to a numerical diversity of “itselfs,” but not to a qualitative disparateness of natures.
Every entity therefore is more than just its private self or bare identity. It possesses a “nature” which because it qualifies the entity is therefore something in some sense over and above or distinct from it. In short every that, as a particular, involves a what or universal. That the what must be universal is seen by considering [128] that if it remains simply enclosed within the particular entity or that as simply one with it we are just as much entitled to ask for its nature as for that of the original that. Again two things cannot be different in nature unless one possesses something not possessed by the other. But whatever either possesses cannot be simply itself over again — but becomes obviously something in addition. Leave this something a mere particular, and the question breaks out anew, the endless differentiation proceeding until we fall back upon the admission of a true nature in terms of a genuine universal-something both beyond and within the thing, its nature and more than its nature, a public not a mere private and unmediated essence or what.1
Argument 2. The nature of a thing is not adequately described as its inclusion in a given class. The only ground for the inclusion of “sky” in the class of blue objects is the presence in the sky, as part at least of its nature, of the intuitively apprehended quality called blueness, or the color blue. No one sees the “class blue” as present in the sky, but only the concrete factor of blueness.
In any case, if the universal is a class, it is internally related to its members, since no object could be what it is — if it were not “what” it is, if it were without its peculiar what or nature. To call the latter a class leaves its importance to the object unaffected.
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[[Note: there is no page 129 . . . manuscript skips from 128 to 130. This I believe is an error in pagination and not a missing page, since the sentence fragment at the top of page 130 seems to complete the fragment at the bottom of page 128. — HyC]]
Argument 3. If, with Professor Spaulding, we describe a quality as a relation of similarity between terms, this relation becomes likewise internal or constitutive.
Moreover, the awkward question remains for such a theorist: what is the possible meaning of similarity, if the old one of partial identity is to be rejected? Surely the relation of similarity is not one quite arbitrarily imposed upon two entities without regard to the natures of each. And how can the natures of each be the similarity between these natures?
Whatever factors in each entity, moreover, may be supposed to condition the relation of similarity (to save it from unconditionedness or arbitrariness) of these factors we once more ask, are they similar, at least in part, or wholly different? The second answer seems absurd, and the first gives rise to an endless regress.2 (Of the second we can say that it is self-contradictory. For two wholly dissimilar factors could not, on Professor Spaulding’s view, even belong alike to the class “factors” or “entities.”)
We conclude then, that the view of the universal as a mere relation leads to absurdity and in any case cannot remove the implication of the internality of such relation.
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Argument 1, 2, 3, summarized as Argument 4a.
No matter how the universal is regarded it cannot be enclosed within the particular thing as in bare identity with it, nor yet as a mere part of it, but must be admitted into a wider sphere of being — as, in truth, universal, something not merely private to the object concerned, but a more public property.
If it should be denied, however, that an object depends upon such a universal to measure its nature as different from that of other objects, on the ground that the object might perhaps be what it is even were there no further objects from which it could differ, we may reply thus: — Even in this case (consistently conceivable or not) the object would be what it would be, a nature would still remain to it. As just the thing over again3 this nature is an obvious absurdity. As a part of the thing it leads to a regress which hardly intensifies the inconsistency apparent at a glance in such a notion. The nature of a thing is somehow the entire thing, and yet more; for it is the thing as relative to something more than itself serving as the standard of its nature or quality, in a word as dependent upon a universal.
Moreover, even if the thing could exist alone and hence [132] differ from no other real thing, it must differ from every possible thing, must contain in itself conditions which together with conditions potential in the possible things, would guarantee its difference from them should they exist. If a thing were not different from other possible things (excepting the class of possibles exactly similar to it, if such be conceivable) surely it could not be regarded as in any sense a definite thing at all, or anything which could be in question as an entity.
Finally, even though this be denied, the entity must certainly differ from nothing at all — and must differ in a determinate manner. Suppress this determinate relation to non-entity and the thing is no more itself than it is nothing or a mere blank: just as in denying the relation to other things you reduce the thing to being no more itself than any other thing.
Thought means by a “thing,” we may thus see, essentially one thing as opposed to others actual or possible, and as opposed to nothing or sheer indeterminateness or absence of outline and form — means it in short, as an expression of a form- giving or determining universal, and as a member of a whole system of actual or possible such expressions.
Argument 4. If every entity involves a what which is universal to it as particular, in a relation which is essential to its being, cannot the same be said of the entitles [133] which are these universals. A universal, whether one be a nominalist or what not, is certainly not nothing. If it is a mere word then it follows from Argument 1 — 3, that the world is purely verbal. In any case the universal is an entity, an individual something which is itself as distinct from any other object of thought. Now precisely the arguments we have employed in regard to an entity as such, apply to those entities called universals. They are not mere thats — and yet they are definite particular thats, if we can discuss them at all — nor are they mere whats. Two qualities cannot differ merely numerically. The difference between blue and red is not simply a matter of number (we are talking of the psychologist’s blue and red). The difference between qualities is qualitative — as much as any other difference. Each quality, not merely is a quality, but — just because it is thus “a” particular object — also has a quality, i.e., is what it is in terms of a nature which is universal with respect to it, as it was with respect to the entity which it was taken to qualify. Thus, as Gentile vividly says, “The category is a category only so long as we do not stare it in the face.” As soon as we do so, as soon as we make an object of that which was used to qualify an object, our determining tool thus objectified becomes in its turn “encircled with the light of a predicate”4 — a further universal is seen to be involved in the definiteness or determinate nature of that which itself was required for [134] the definiteness of the initial particular.
Our whole present argument is that no halt can be called or justified in this process of analysis, that if anything is to be known as definite, a knowledge of an idle regressness must be assumed completed, — unless we lead the ascending series, which rises by inevitable logic from the particular as starting point to ever wider circles of universality, to its completion in a universal which can be what it is in its own terms precisely because it measures in its own terms all the differences between and upon all levels of the series — including its own.
It may be objected that such a completion contradicts the principle which was held to generate the series. This principle was that every entity, as one among others, and as different from them and from non-entity in a determinate fashion, must stand in essential relation to a. standard of such determinate and particular quality or, that this quality cannot be just the thing itself in its sheer self-identity, nor yet but a part of the thing. In arguing from this principle we were opposing above all the new-realist doctrine of atomic entities — which simply are themselves, devoid of all multiplicity or inner relations. If this doctrine be abandoned, we qualify our position so far as to admit that the nature of a thing can be self contained or in intrinsic terms, on two-conditions which in the end, as Mr. Bradley would say, are doubtless one. These conditions, [135] to defer “the end,” at least a moment, are, namely: (1) That the entity contain what qualities it has in an Infinite degree, and (2) That it contain in itself the measure of all other qualities, actual or possible. Let us endeavor to explain the need for these conditions.
(1) If the entity has a quality only in a certain degree of intensity, or of magnitude, then this degree as a determinate degree is relative to a standard of degree. In a self-qualified entity this standard must lie in the nature of the entity itself. As no finite degree can serve as a standard of degree, since to compare it with any other degree implies a third standard by reference to which both are compared, and the third if finite introduces the same problem (Cf. Section 10 for a fuller discussion) to render degrees conceivable at all we must admit an absolute standard to which all degrees are relatives. To say that the standard is the given quality in infinite degree may appear untenable. For an infinite magnitude, for instance, cannot measure a finite, all finite quantities being equally infinitesimal when set in ratio with an unlimited quantity. But this is simply one of the many roads to the perception of the fact that quantity is really dependent upon, and determined by, quality — and that the true infinite is one of perfection not of bigness. Absolute power is the standard of all degrees, if our view of the matter is true. (Section 12).
Self-qualification, then, involves infinite intensity [136] of quality — at least in the form of unlimited potency or power. Limits are definite with respect not to an unlimited quantity, but to an absolute power whose self-limitation is involved in the very being of such limits. The standard is the perfection of that power in its own self-realization — a perfection of a capacity which it can extend to limited beings in limited degree just because that capacity is not perfectible with reference to an absolute quantity, but with reference to an absolute of another order — a complete self-possession, or a full realization of all meanings present to such and absolute. Put in another way, the standard is absolute power exercised by a being over its own life, a power free from all discontent with itself and so possessed of a perfection of happiness and well-being. Again, we may attempt to express what is (we admit) only relatively and meagerly expressible by the concept of a perfect love — a realized power and willingness to rejoice only in the sharing of joy, hence a power employing itself in the creation and preservation of beings possessed in their degree of this same power of harmonious or social valuation.
Such values possess degree, there is implied in our hypothesis of reality, a standard of value which, on that hypothesis, is equivalent to, a measure of all qualities. Further discussion of the conception of such a standard must be deferred to the Section on Value.
Our second condition for a what completing the widening [137] circle of universals with a highest quality or what, is that this quality should characterize in its own terms the nature of all other whats, should possess them as differentiations of its own nature. For otherwise a still higher universal must be sought to measure the distinction between the highest nature and the lower.
The series of expanding universals, generated by the need, with any two distinct universals, of a quality not purely private to or in bare identity with either, in order that each may, in comparison with the other and also with non-entity, possess a nature not just its oneness or numerical distinctness, that each as a quality should possess its own peculiar kind or quality of quality, can thus reach its end only in a quality which is self-distinguished or self-qualified, and which at the same time contains in itself all distinctions of quality in the lower levels of the series.
Professor Spaulding’s argument, that this is a contradiction, errs — as we have noted (Section 3 (9) ) in failing to conceive the universal as concrete. “Animality” as defined by science does not include the qualities of two legs, or of four, but only of having members or organic parts of some kind. Nevertheless, conceiving the principle of organization, and of adjustment to circumstances with its implications of a scale of degrees of complexity and of success, we perceive a sense in which two legs and four [138] legs can be regarded as expressions of such a principle, which must be seen as what they are, in part at least, in essential relation to the principle as standard of the level of animal development attained. And if, further, we develop the suggestion of teleology or purpose involved in the idea of life of any sort, we attain a conception of degrees or kinds of value which on our own hypothesis, is capable of measuring all differences. Professor Spaulding, then, can not legitimately use — as he does — such biological conceptions as proof of the thinness of a comprehensive universal. He who sees in the animal kingdom nothing if not an expression of the Beneficence of God, cannot regard “animal” as a meaning devoid of the differentia of the species off animals. For since to be an animal is to express a Divine Interest or Plan, the difference between animals which is provided for in that Plan is immanent in the ultimate significance of the concept of animal. Of course “animal” is not “to be two-legged,” as “Ostrich” is to be so constructed; but to be an animal may be to be two-legged, and the character of two legs would be seen as part of the ultimate meaning and purpose of the organic world by anyone who really saw clearly what animal life ultimately is in terms of the World Life. “Animality,” as a department in the realm of values, would certainly not appear as simply without two-leggedness, but as possessing this quality inclusively and not exclusively — i.e., in a manner consistent with its [139] possession also of the character of four-leggedness. The significance of the difference between the two, finally, would likewise be provided for, in the nature of the value of “animality” in general.
Conclusion: Our argument is that a thing is not just an “it” or a “that” — but an it or that with a character or quality. This character or quality itself is one kind or quality of character rather than another. To know any quality thus becomes the knowledge of every member of an endless series of universals, unless we admit a universal which is self-characterized, i.e., is what it is solely in its own terms or relatively to itself. We have in such a universal a that whose what is distinguished from the that and yet one with it. Its character leads to no further kind of this character, for the quality of the quality in question is not only self-characterized but the character of this characterization is self-characterized5 — i.e., it is what it is to itself. Self-reflection is of its essence. What it is to itself — this being for or to self is its nature. The distinction of what and that is pervaded by an identity which lives in the very process of self-division and is that process. There is, moreover, no further regress of kinds of quality, for the reason that the highest quality must be conceived as distinguishing itself from other kinds.
The uniqueness of a kind of the [140] ultimate Nature is not a matter of a wider class including it as a member, but of a quality which contrasts itself as perfection with other kinds as inferior degrees or imperfect manifestations of itself. The meaning of kind, or quality of quality, is thus preserved with the highest Nature, as the contrast between itself and its partial reflections in its creatures, a contrast needing no further class or kind to mediate it because the highest Nature itself mediates and records all differences.
We have perhaps shifted rather confusedly from the requirement that a thing and its nature should not be in a pure identity — as this at once asserts and denies a distinction; and the requirement that, in comparison with other things, the nature of a thing must not be purely private to itself, itself over again, because then we cannot say that we have one kind or quality of quality rather than another, but only a numerically distinct quality, as to nature undifferentiated. The first requirement alone, we have said, suggests the self-reflection or inward duplication of mind. This process of being-for-self would then be regarded as the essential principle of the quality of a thing. The what which a thing is to itself is realized and characterized in terms of that relation of being or of meaning to self. Quality becomes self-meaning, self-realization, enjoyment, value. What this experience is in and for itself, is to be qualified only by this self-relation which is ultimate, and includes the [141] identity of self as a that or it, plus the nature of that self as self-intuited, and both the being and its quality are real essentially in and by virtue of the process of self- relation or self-realization. If, then, one asks finally, what now at last is the nature of this particular case of self-meaning the only answer must be, to know this fully you must make it your own, include it in your own experience, actual or imagined. The regress thus comes to an end6 by the remembrance that immediacy is the ultimate foundation of meaning and quality, and that the onlooking mind must not remain purely onlooking if it is to get to the end of approximating universals, which themselves need characterization endlessly. If you want to conceive anything by another fashion than endeavoring to complete such a series you must realize the thing in your own imaginative experience as an expression of the ultimate (since the thing rests upon and means the One Experience) standard and reference of all meaning, the last Self-Meaning, which is known only by having it immediately and the very nature of which is this immediacy of self-significance, or — for us — of value as self-realization or [142] enjoyment.
On any view of the what as independent of mind, every what leads to another, and the end cannot be reached, while without it all is determined only as something (a universal) which is undetermined. This inconsistency is avoided by admitting that while the thing and its nature may be distinguished, this is by the self-reflection of immediacy which itself has a nature no doubt but one expressible only in terms of immediacy itself. The realist holds that immediacy gives essences not further definable. Unfortunately he fails to see that this implies that such essences are of the stuff of immediacy — they have their what only as aspects of self-realized experience. If they had any other status the halt in the procession of universals could not be rendered legitimate. No determination could exist since any quality regarded as fixing or expressing the nature of a thing would itself remain a mere X until subject to its own determination, etc. The end is reached only by admitting what is implied by the relation of immediacy to the situation — on any theory. To know you must have or possess experientially, in the end, and to conceive you must likewise realize in ultimate materials of meaning as differentiations of that Self-Meaning which is the final reference of all things and is the inescapable and essential forever self-characterized and ultimate principle of thought. Only by admitting such a one ultimate Reference in terms of [143] which you compare all things, and which itself is known and experienced as determinate without a regress only because its self-characterizing quality or self-realization is always in a partial identity with our own as its embracing principle, and because by quality we mean always just phases of this one Supreme Quality.7
Finally, we note that, like Being and Individuality, Quality is, in itself, a wholly universal universal; thus one all-constitutive or concrete if fully understood. Remove the possession of quality from a thing and you suppress the thing. Subtract this and you subtract all. The just inference is that its possession-of-quality is all there is to the thing. Now subtract “quality” from this possession, and it becomes nothing. Hence “quality” is shown to be the all of things. It reveals itself as a concept referring ultimately to the all-embracing Life in terms of significance to which and in those terms essentially all qualities, as we hold, are real.
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Endnotes
1. Cf. Bosanquet: “The judgement of difference is never made apart from a standard of difference.” Logic, p. 117.
2. Cf. Lossky: “The conception of likeness in general must either involve the conception of numerical identity or lead to an infinite regress.” Also the quotation, following from Husserl. N.O. Lossky. The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge. London 1919, p. 308.
3. Every thing is a “the thing.” Its character is more than its being an instance of “thing” — the question is: what kind of a thing?
4. It must not be thought that this qualification of the category is superfluous to its significant use. The mind cannot tie predicates to things with its eyes shut to the predicates. If the predicate is nothing (has no character) to the mind, very well — it is nothing. And the result of predication also is for the mind — nothing.
5. I. e., Self-Characterization is of its essence and this essence is what it intuits as its own nature.
6. In immediacy the quality the thing has for us as an element in our conscious realization of meaning, since it is essentially a meaning to mind, provides for a distinction between the object and its nature as that between its meaning or value and the principle possessing or offering us this value. But the distinction thus gained is lost, unless meaning is admitted as equivalent to quality; and furthermore meaning must be regarded as self-qualified or essentially self-conscious and determined — or the meaning itself calls for a nature or quality — and so on.
7. On the idea of a monism of quality without ontological monism, in the form of an idealistic pluralism, see Section 11.