The Unity of Being
Part II Section 14
[286]
Section 14
Conclusion
The course which has been run was characterized in the Introduction as a progressive examination of ultimate categories of thought, from the abstract or implicit to the more concrete and explicit, with a view to discovering the relation of the initial category of Being to the subsequent categories. We saw that Being, or what is predicted in the words “to be” could not be regarded as a mere abstraction, in its ultimate content. For to abstract from this abstraction proved to be the removal of all. Hence we inferred that the full content of all falls within the nature of Being, or the root or minimum meaning, that which gives the concept its identity, of the word “is.” To take this meaning as a mere word for the collection of beings proved absurd, unless each thing is to be what it is in terms solely of the whole collection.
This was made more clear in the concept of individuality. Nothing could be except as distinct, definite, or a “this.” To make such a distinctness the whole of distinct entities is absurd, since such a whole presupposes the principle whose meaning is sought. Yet without “distinctness,” as such, nothing could be at all. In-[287] dividuality, thus proved to contain the full possibility of things in itself, to be the measure of the difference between all and nothing, and yet not simply the all, as a collection.
The meaning of a whole of parts showed itself likewise intractable to a pluralistic view of Being. The one formed out of many was yet not its many parts, but a result whose unity implied an including individual in terms of the unitary consequence to which, or as the product of its relating and embracing activity,1 the whole must be conceived.
Quality, we saw, led to a regress, i.e., of qualities or natures of the qualities; a regress halted, and so determinate knowledge rendered possible, only by a quality qualifying and differentiating all qualities out of its own self-differentiated nature. Such a quality suggested the power of mind.
Relations, as external, implied a ground or Relating Principle, — as relative to which all qualities are predicated, — internal in terms — on our hypothesis — of intrinsic worth or value (on the analogy, which was more than an analogy, of friendship); and external in terms of contributions of value to a larger whole. On a pluralist view predicates as such split into two wholly discordant and contradictory halves; and the difference, likewise, between a relation as just a relation and one as relating proved [288] to be nothing if not a new relation between relation and term — thus quite directly initiating a regress.
On the monistic view, all relations being regarded as aspects of the One Relating Life and nothing apart from it, therefore in the being of an actual relation the term is already thought, and a change from one relation to another involved a change in the relating activity itself, from one aspect to another. The difference thus between a relation relating and one not relating becomes the difference between a conceptually abstracted aspect of the capacity of the One, and that capacity in its actual functioning. The reality here is not the relation as an independent entity — this is a mere fiction of the mind — but the One inclusive of and relating the many. The many-as-related-by-the-One becomes the unit of thought and no regress of new relations is required to get from the meaning: “things and relations,” to “things-related,” for (as the first phrase indeed implies) things-related is what we mean by things. Since “real2-for-Being”and “real” are one; and therefore “things self-related to-by-and within Being” is the beginning of thought, not a result which must be achieved by interposing relations of being-related between what is to relate and the object.3
[289] Space and Time we saw appeared, both in their immanent or not merely collective unity embracing the parts, and in their character as concrete and inclusive wholes which nevertheless could only be thought as one or complete in abstract terms of spatiality or temporality; to imply a more concrete character of unity than they adequately supplied. In order to take account of minds, which must be included in the whole of things, we saw that wholeness as characterized by extension and temporality, was likewise insufficient. Extension and time were found in experience, but experience could not be thought as falling within a merely space-time whole. And finally magnitude implied an ultimate standard neither finite and relative, nor quantitatively infinite — but qualitatively ultimate or self-characterized — harboring and fulfilling its own ideal and measure of quantity and quality.4 Such a standard we suggested experience as a whole, with its self-comparison in terms of just noticeable or minimum significant differences, i.e., with its system of valuations of relative richness of content, seemed not only to offer but to actually employ as the foundation of science. We thought to derive support here from Professor Whitehead — following the example of Viscount Haldane, though with less emphasis upon the particular theory of relativity.
In the conception of knowledge we found the necessity for a characterization of all qualities, not only as before [290] in terms of one quality, but this time more definitely in terms of mind. And we argued that only as something-to-knowledge, or as meaningful to thought, could anything be an object of thought. The unity of mind and object proved ultimate, since only within or in terms of, the self-significant, self-qualifying, and to itself, certainly known existence of a knowledge-whole, could anything be known to be anything.5
Under the caption of Value we endeavored to show that an understanding of what value is, and of what its chief relations and laws are, could only be had satisfactorily and consistently in terms of an ultimate social relation of other — interest or love; of a valuation able and essentially concerned to appreciate a good not merely its own as good at once both for it and for another, with the other good an inseparable aspect of its own. Such a view seemed to make possible an escape from all the inconsistencies and fallacies charged upon idealism. The object becomes no mere creature of the human subject. Yet its meaning or value to him, in entering into his self-realization, and by the way of love, becoming one with it, must reflect or grasp the value, meaning, or quality which it has apart from him. This implied that it must involve the same creative principle of self-realization which constitutes the essence of the value of the subject’s experience. And thus mind as creative of the nature of things is consistently — it is thought and [291] hoped — set forth.
The creative principle of self-realization, however, which operates in the human self cannot be merely the human subject. For then the finitude of the latter is absurd — an activity measuring its own imperfections and yet imperfectly self-known. And, again, the social character of valuation prevents us from in any way inclining toward the pit-fall of solipsism. Hence the human valuation must involve a Perfect and Universal Valuation, which values the object as it is apart from the human subject, and is thus its inner essence or reality: and values also the subjectively enjoyed value (of the particular subject), — realizing a more or less identical value element as belonging both to the given subject’s experience and also as significant in other references,6 i.e., as the objects reality apart from the given subject.
We endeavored to show that aesthetic experience, carefully analyzed, exhibited the appreciatory aspect of experience as simply its essence or moving principle, and thus that all qualities, as matter for experience, and so, — on our view of the absurdity of a purely subjective or mutilating and distorting awareness of objects as they are not, and of the attempt to conceive qualities not in the least [292] revealed in experience, — to show that all qualities whatever, fall within the category of value.
The problem of the unity of Being received final notice. It seemed possible to conceive the Perfect Interest as registering all reality in terms of the differences made to or in the life of that Interest; and likewise to regard this inscription or inclusion within the survey of an all-benevolent regard, as essential to the reality of finite being as such. For only as valued does a person experience any full sense of value. And human valuations seemed insufficient, as too fluctuating and too inaccurate, to represent the complete and final ground of our worth to the universe. And, in any case, the need for a Standard Valuation in order to allow for objective experience of a real other, had already been formulated in the previous section. We thus have a One, embracing in its life of love, the natures of all things, in such a manner that apart from this Being, no finite beings can be conceived. This fulfills our definition of Monism — as the conception of a Being sustaining all things and qualifying them in terms of the forms assumed by its own unitary nature. A love which includes in its sense of value the values of all things, must thus differentiate its self-realized enjoyment or valuation into precisely the variety of objects or finite value-realizations which are recipients of its love — if, at least, the love is to be perfect or all-appreciating.
[293] In the final section we reviewed the questions arising in a connection with the Ontological Argument; concluding that it is sound in so far as it proves that whatever is conceivable as self-existent and self-individuated must be thought as identical with nothing, and so an empty absurdity, unless it, as an object of thought (which is not just the thought of which it is the object)7 is conceived as truly endowed with that self-realizing nature whose self-reality is that which alone can fundamentally be meant by its existence, and which must be thought as in no relation whatever to existence — again rendering it a sheer absurdity — unless it is thought as the essence of being, existence, and all other meanings applied to it.
In the second place we found that our ideal of personal worth can be adequately formulated, in outline, and only adequately formulated, as a Perfect Person; including all in the compass of his power, and dependent upon nothing; in order thus to be able to guarantee and effectively cherish the welfare of the whole. We saw no place in such a conception for any externally attachable existence, requisite for the reality of such a Person. Such a factor is a contradiction of complete power, and also of the complete [294] self-relativity of all the meanings employed by a fully self-determined Mind.
Finally, we urged that the conception of the Perfect Mind is thought implicitly in all thought; as the full meaning of our sense of insufficiency, both in regard to valuations of the type which, on our view, constitute knowledge; and in regard to good of all kinds. Any judgment of a more to be known about the object, implied a limit of knowledge as giving what the object altogether is, and such knowledge could only be conceived as possessed by a mind all of whose meanings were clear to it because its self-realization constituted the essence of the meanings. From the side of ethical judgments, and judgments of the degrees of perfection attained in relations of comradeship and social understanding, a standard again appeared in the form of the Ideal Personality, in relation to whom, as an all-appreciative socius our own real worth, as a dimly felt criterion of judgments about us, was felt; a worth conceived as worth to an Interest which if directed toward us would allow all our powers of social response full and perfect opportunity to realize themselves, and so reveal their exact character; and a worth also as tested by the ideal of a perfect social response, in comparison to which our own relative obtuseness and selfishness is judged.
Thus all life appeared to issue in a fundamental [295] and ineradicable idea, which, conceived together with the truth about it,8 constituted a self-contradiction, unless the Perfect Person was, throughout, in some degree of dim apprehension, felt and intended as real.
Such is the program, as we have tried to fulfill it. A few remarks may, perhaps, be added.
In the first place, it may be noted how our idea of all categories as inter-definitive of each other, is fulfilled. For quality, being, relation, space and time, knowledge — all these modes of realizing the world are caught up and explicitly and clearly seen as living elements within, a single Life of Significance or Value. “Quality” — what is of value is not featureless. “Relation” — value to us is essentially a relation of persons. “Space” — conceive a realm of finite and socially related beings, except in terms of an experience of unity in diversity substantially similar to spatial experience.
It is to be especially pointed out that the inclusion of categories in the good is not a mere imbedding of alien elements — as in conglomerate rock.9 He who realizes and enjoys the nature of love does not in the least depend upon a tagging of this experience as an instance of “relation” in order to grasp it.
To enjoy the [296] values of all things we need only to enjoy them — and knowledge is already attained if the values stand clear. The relation in the relation of love is of the essence of love itself — and all other instances of “relatedness” are to us degrees and aspects of love.
In respect to intellectual or abstract knowledge,10 the view of logic and mathematics as essentially a development of purposive relations among ideas or valuations, has appeared satisfactory to minds of the caliber of Royce, Bradley, James and Taylor. Valuational Monism incorporates in itself what seems the reasonable element in Pragmatism — the contention, namely, that to possess the (direct and indirect) values of things is to possess all. The indirect or truly instrumental values are revealed by science, on any philosophy except one undermining the rational justification for our belief in science. Our argument for the Being of God not depending upon science, but resting upon genuine support derived from a mere analysis of knowing and the criterion of reality employed — that of a Being not conceivable as non-existent without inconsistency — we can found faith in science upon faith in a Rational Orderer of things, whose will it is that steady growth in understand-[297]ing and control of the world should be the lot of living beings since such benevolence is the essence of God as we are able to conceive him.11
The intrinsic value of the world system as a teleological structure or revelation of an all-informing Plan, are also yielded by Monism of the type defended.
Beyond scientific and practical knowledge, which is a matter of what values to expect in relation to a given experience, without concerning ourselves about the nature of these values, no further instrumental values are apparent which are not provided for on our view. For if the world be not greatly good no enduring purpose could be served by knowing this. The loss to life would counterbalance any gain. Indeed, if the world is not, to be thought as in its principles, Perfect beyond any rival conception we might form, then so far we must view life as realizing or serving no good which might not be greater; and therefore so far must we regard existence as a more or less mediocre and only relatively attractive calling. In so far we must feel called to less than the utmost of devotion to life, since life is less deserving of our devotion than it would be in some other conceivable universe. The will to make the best of things which are [298] more or less bad is not a wholly single-hearted and satisfactory ground of enthusiasm. Thus even instrumental values lead us to a demand for a Truth supremely objective, though supremely valuable — the truth of the religious conviction of a Perfect Reality whom we are capable of loving with such entire devotion that His infinite Goodness and the Goodness of the Universe as a Divine Plan and Society, become sufficient to us, and as one with our own. The identification of wills leads to the view of all satisfaction of desire and all delight as adding to the worth of existence for us: because for the Divine, who is infinitely more to us than ourselves.
The questions about the problem of evil, call perhaps for one so far omitted reply. It has often seemed to men incredible that a Beneficient Being should create finite consciousnesses only to leave them in isolation and doubt, cut off — as has even been said — from any word as to their Creator’s reality and beneficence. One may give as an answer to this the instances of mystics of all degrees, of religious people generally, who have believed themselves aware not only of the existence, but of the Divine Love, of the One. But all such testimonies can conceivably be doubted. However, there is one special witness to the Benevolence of the ultimate forces whose word and revelation of faith stand unique. It is after all only just and the part of sanity to remember that it was precisely the [299] Greatest and Divinest of men who declared himself to be a messenger of God, a deliberate token of love, and that for the fact that this was the message given, and that forces more impressive than those ever allying themselves with any man operated to promote its promulgation, we have the unique testimony of a faith which has meant power in the face of every obstacle, from the early cases of the ostensibly forsaken apostles and the skeptic Paul, to the present day. This testimony, we believe, can reasonably be set as of some significance against the darker aspects of human life; and many there are, we may even add, who would not be found unwilling to die to emphasize their belief in its conclusiveness.
[300] We may finally add a last word upon the very different conclusiveness, if any, to be claimed for the present inquiry.
The confession was made in the Introduction that the primary aim of our discussion would be the attempted exhibition of the motives, on grounds of consistency versus contradiction, which lead men to accept the Monistic and Spiritual, or the Theistic, view of the universe. This aim therefore excluded any thoroughgoing examination of the important criticisms of the view in question; or of all the motives which on the grounds of at least apparent inconsistency, have led men to reject it. Here at the end of our discussion it is more than appropriate not only to recall this confession, which in a way may be thought as the admission of a failure to achieve or even to attempt, a wholly impartial or judicious examination of the ultimate questions involved on their entire merits, or on all significant aspects prior to any championship of a conclusion, not only do we reiterate this confession but wish to repeat it with added emphasis and explicitness. Certainly significant and in no way trifling or easily manageable objections are open to the Theistic view; objections of which not all have in our treatment received an attention adequate from any point of view — even as a mere outline of the alternatives involved. Chief among such problems are perhaps the questions of Time and its relation to the Divine Life; and certain aspects of the problem of freedom. As to the [301] first, we have not discussed the nature of the time aspects (and there must in some sense be such an aspect in any living and active reality) as qualifying the Divine Existence. It can only be said that the difficulties which can be set forth are perhaps not essentially novelties in philosophy, and that relative satisfaction has seemed possible to no mean intellects. That, also the accusation of contradictions in the account rendered of time is made in good earnest against all alternative views. On the matter of freedom, we have the old question of foreknowledge and “fixed-fate.” We find Royce denying foreknowledge but asserting an eternal knowledge, knowledge without a date but embracing all dates. And, on the other hand, we note Professor Ward12 repudiating such an eternal standpoint above time, and denying the reality of the future so long as it is future — except no doubt in its general pre-determined outline or plan. A Divine self-limitation of knowledge is supposed. But this problem we also do not discuss.
Again, we have left unattacked the view of “freedom” as unacceptable if we are to be loyal to the interests of science. This seems to us erecting a relative methodological demand into an absolute theoretical principle which is not justified or required upon the grounds adduced — if these are carefully considered. But we cannot enter the lists upon this question.
[302] As to the conceivability of creation, we believe this difficulty can be met, — on the grounds that as we cannot know experientially what it is to be a creator of a personal being, we cannot any better imagine such an act — to imagine being but to reproduce and to elaborate the elements given in direct experience. On the other hand if we could not in a genuine sense conceive it, it would remain a hopeless paradox that millions of men of highest as well as of all degrees of intelligence should have supposed that they were conceiving it. That such conception should be possible only because in a sense we do experience the process in question — in that continued creation by which we, as contingent beings, are sustained within a medium of reality not grounded in ourselves — experience it thus from our own side of the transaction, and thus and only from this cause, attain to the conception in question, appears to be a reasonable and just account of the matter.
But, in fine, we cannot pretend to have demonstrated the impossibility of cogent objections; or, from the standpoint of metaphysics as a science, to know with assurance that no serious objections can further be encountered. Metaphysics, though it determines upon final issues, is never in any full sense capable of finality. It cannot be shown by reason that everything has been considered and rendered satisfactory. As Mr. Bradley has remarked,13 there is only one type of skepticism which is so manifestly self-[303]destructive or inconsistent as to deserve the name of stupid; and there is another of quite a different order.
We can not intelligently say that it is a certainty that ultimate knowledge is out of the question. But we can with no such obvious absurdity allege that we, at least, have not as yet become assured that any proposed account is free from its difficulties, or that we can determine14 how far the conception in question might have to be altered in order to free it from some apparent or even some as yet purely hypothetical difficulties.
Metaphysics, thus, as a science of objective demonstration, rather than a completely final word, available for all capable of any considerable comprehension of its technique, is but a fair suggestion or hint, when tested by its own ideal. It is but a word of reasonable advice, weighty but not wholly imperious or commanding, which is offered to the reflective man. The entire emphasis of the great facts and experiences of life must impress itself upon heart and mind and soul of each individual — with the only genuine finality, or final lack of finality, which he can encounter.
Nonetheless may it be true that the great heroes of the strenuous struggle in the arena of logic, engaged therein with their whole living experience and its felt meaning, have been successful in seeing, for themselves at least here and there or in flashes at least if never on all sides and continuously, certain ultimate implications of life and thought.
It may perhaps be possible to see that an idea must be and is [304] substantially true and to see the sufficient reasons for this, without at the same time comprehending all aspects and the answers to all possible questions. In such a way, and in a fashion which the foregoing pages have sought to set forth, is it our belief that the greatest of thinkers and, multitudes of their humbler followers, lifted to the vision through sympathetic participation, have attained to a perception of true and profound relations among the elements and. meanings employed by the inquiring mind and so of the nature and significance of the universe.
Considering the matter thus both historically and on its own merits we find that our own conclusion cannot be less than that metaphysics appears plainly to offer genuine, and, in its sphere, unique rational grounds — whether or not they be thought sufficient, either alone or in connection with other evidence such as ethical or religious intimations, — for the acceptance as the true account of the universe, of that last sublime, and highest conception: that, namely, which trusts to find its object in a supremely Perfect, Rational, and Beneficent Being.
“In Whom” — or in whose love — “dwells the World.”
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Endnotes
1. Producing a whole in terms of a single object of interest or value to itself — on our view.
2. Or significant.
3. Change of relations becomes changing in the whole formed from the Parts by the One Relating.
4. The world as a whole of parts seems incapable of supplying a standard of quantity because we conceive it as determinate only by conceiving the parts already as determinate.
5. Even to be no more than what is meant by “all reality.”
6. I.e., as either an element in an other finite experience or possibly simply in the One’s own experience — owned primarily by it, and participated in by other subjects in so far as their experience is allowed to intuit or embrace it.
7. We saw, too, that if Perfection as object of our idea be regarded as an element or part of the idea, this proved only that Perfection or the Divine must be immanent in our conception of it, and no mere part of our thoughts.
8. Thus all thought either thinks a falsity or a contradiction — if it is true that God is not.
9. Viewed from the ordinary and provisional standpoint.
10. If the metaphysics which has been defended is sound, of course an understanding of abstract categories and relationships is shown to be realizable only and essentially in terms of an adequate appreciation of the Divine significance and value of life.
11. The sense that we are aware of a rational, reliable, and sublimely unified order of things is certainly too completely in harmony with the belief in Intelligent and Divine Unity not to receive an assurance from this harmony it could in no other way attain.
12. J. Ward, The Realm of Ends.
13. Essays, p. 445.
14. Or have succeeded in determining.
END