The Unity of Being
Part II Section 9
[144]
Section 9
Relations
A. External Relations.
Thesis: External or non-contributory relations imply an underlying reality to “mediate” these.
Argument 1. Let us consider the three factors: the term A, the relation R, and the relatedness or being- related of A by R. The third factor, the being-related is said to be a property of A but one not forming any part of its nature. Now “a property of,” apparently, can have either the usual meaning of a part of the nature of a thing, or else the exactly opposite meaning of something not contributing to the nature of the thing. In the first case a property is something which the thing is, in the second something which it precisely and absolutely is not.
The first objection then to relations which are both pluralistic and external is that this conception of them involves two contradictory definitions, claiming to represent the meaning of the single concept, property of. A property as what the thing is, is intelligible. A property of a thing as, whatever else it may be, not a part of the thing is unintelligible in the sense that we see no more reason for calling it the property of A than of any other [145] entity X.
Argument 2. If being-related by R is not a part of A, then — if it is to belong to A in any sense whatever — it must stand in some other relation than “part of” to A. In short it must, even if not in the manner usually denoted by “property of,” be related to A.
Thus, in addition to R, and related-by-R,we have a relation R1 between A and related-by-R such that it can be said that it is A and not B or X that is related-by-R. Now this further relation R1 simply repeats the problem. In short the attempt to define “property of” as compatible with “external to” leads to an empty endless regress, which however is only additional and not the primary evidence of the absurdity of the attempt.
For so long as the internal essence of a thing is regarded pluralistically as a purely private unmediated essence, so long all properties not so enclosed within the thing are absolutely without any status as properties, since no common element between their position and that of the genuine or internal properties can be found. Both, therefore, cannot be properties or predicates if that word has any identical meaning in the two cases. If it has not the whole structure of predication falls. Predicates absolutely internal and predicates absolutely external, is a conjunction of ideas that destroys itself.
[146]
Argument 3. The factor of being-related has really no chance even to exist or to be at all, upon the strictly pluralistic view. For if it is anything at all, it is an entity. So that, over and above the classes of relations and terms, we need a further class of entities, namely, a class of relatednesses. And then we have to bring entities into relation not only by means of relations but of relatednesses.
If it is objected: but relatedness is just the fact of being-related; it may be replied: the fact that A is related by R is merely the truth of the assertion that A possesses the property of being so related, and in any case the assertion A R (X) is nothing if not the ascription of a relation between A and R (and X). Predication surely asserts a relation between subject and predicate — in this case A and related-by R. It is denied that this relation is one of internal possession or logical inclusion. But in any case we have between A and its relatedness some relation such as to make the proposed predication true. Hence we have a new R1 between A and relatedness. This relation cannot be internal on the atomic view, and if it were the result would be that R must also be internal. (For being-related-by-R logically includes R). Therefore, we have to inquire of R1 as of R what it has to do with A — since it cannot claim to contribute to its nature as A. And the only possible defense of R1 is to ascribe some [147] peculiar relation between it and A, and thus to provide the third step of an unavoidable but clearly nonsensical regress.
Argument 4. Between the conception of A as related by R, and as not so related, there must clearly be a difference (Bradley, following Stout — Essays, 289). The difference cannot be a difference in A nor in R — on the purely atomic view. The only remaining possibility is to regard it as a difference in the relation between A and R.1 This is proof enough of the inevitability of the endless regress on the view in question. The difference between “A and R and B,” and “A R B” is manifestly nothing but a change in the relations holding among these entities. For surely it is not simply the rise of a further entity — i.e., simply one more factor requiring relatedness to the rest. The complex “A R B” may be a new entity but it is admittedly formed out of the aggregate — A, R, B, and clearly, if not admittedly, only by a certain organizing of this complex, i. e. introduction into it of new relations between its members.
Even if the strictly atomic view be given up, and an internal complexity of R be admitted; so that relating A could be regarded as a peculiar state of R, still since this state is nothing without A, A then becomes internal to R and falls within its being.
[148] Moreover the meaning of related-by-R as a property of A is still in the contradictory state referred to of a property which contributes nothing. What it contributes, it may be replied, is precisely an external relation. But the contradiction remains that this contribution leaves the object just as before within itself and, therefore, can consist solely in an external relating of the object to and the external relation. Aside from the endless series, the difficulty is also on our hands of indicating any difference to A which constitutes it and not some other object as the possessor of R.
Argument 5. A final objection to our reasoning might be this, Whether A or B externally possesses R, one might say, is a question to be settled not indeed by examining A as it is in. its internal nature — but by examining the total situation in which A appears at such and such a point. James, in The Pluralistic Universe, thus pleads that for actual experience and observation relations present themselves perfectly naturally and without any stress of experienced contradiction. Empirically taken, they are no more enigmatic than objects. With this latter statement James’ opponent, Bradley, night indeed agree. But the former’s plea is really an exposure of the external pluralist’s fallacy. Of course in a total situation the relations of the elements can be discriminated. But in this case the latter are identified as individuals through the [149] indispensable means of some at least of their relations. And we have not by such report of experience as James and others adduce, accomplished the task requisite for the pluralist; namely, the task of intellectually constructing a whole out of atomic entities and atomic relations. What we have done is to start with a whole of elements already organized by one common all-embracing relation, namely, that of being experienced or thought together, and then determined this general relation of experienced-together in a specific manner. The particular relations thus arising may perhaps be external, but the general relation of being together in an experience — whole may not be; and may indeed (it does for Mr. Bradley) constitute exactly that all-pervasive factor mediating the external relations which the present section seeks to defend.
What is given is a whole of distinguishable elements or aspects with distinguishable relations. What is not given is the pluralistic contention, which we specify as follows:
1. That the elements of experience are independent entities pervaded by no common life.
2. That what relates things is a relation.
In regard to (1) we repeat our suggestion that all elements of experience are, even manifestly, pervaded by a common principle, namely, that of all alike possessing meaning and meaning for one and the same apprehending mind.
[150] All are something-to-us, ultimately (we hold) of value to us and the unity of value and by implication of a reference or standard and a ground of value1 is no far-fetched conclusion from the empirical starting-point.
In regard to (2) we insist that though things are seen to be related in various fashions it is not seen that they are related simply by relations. In thinking of my house as higher than the street on which it is placed, what relates my image of ray house and of the street is not the relation higher than, but the comparing activity of myself as thinking mind. And in experiencing the house and its location, though I do not by thought create the relation between the two, neither can I be sure that it is the mere relation higher than which relates the two factors mentioned. Things stand in relations, i. e. They are related in one way or another. But there is really little more reason for holding that a relation is that which relates, than that an inference is that which infers, or a dream that which dreams — or, for that matter, a chopping that which chops, or music something that makes sweet sounds. Given things related, the result is a set of relations between them. The way in which they are related constitutes the kind of relation [151] holding between them.2
The way in which they are related constitutes the kind of relation [151] holding between them.3 In short to relate is a certain function, but like other functions it requires an agent — which agent is not just the function taken over again.
Conclusion of Section 9 A.
Our objection to external relations in conjunction with a fundamental pluralism has fallen mainly into two forms of statement.
1. A purely external property is an unmeaning or else contradictory conception.
2. Since the relation is not something the thing is, it can have nothing to do with the thing at all in preference to any other thing, except by virtue of a special (external) relation between the original relation and the thing. The result is an infinite regress which we take as the sign of the absurdity of the atomic view of relations. One is simply endeavoring to resuscitate a dead and functionless relation by multiplying effigies of its corpse.
How are these two difficulties met by a Valuational Monism. We take them in order.
(1) For our Monistic view, the internal nature of a thing is its value to the One — the value which it has directly, in and for its own sake (as another man may have to me an intrinsic worth through my love for him as a [152] fellow human being).
The external relations of a thing are aspects of its status to the One, not as directly valuable but as fulfilling a purpose in relation to a larger whole or unit of value. Thus I am of this or that worth in the universe in and for my self, as the possessor of intrinsic value. If a leaf falls in China my direct value may remain unaffected. But both the leaf and I are of interest to the One, not simply distributively and directly, but also as units in a whole, as the notes in a symphony have each a sweetness and value of their own, are also a contributory power in respect to the whole. On our view the human individuals, for instance, though they form notes in a symphony, result with other beings in a whole with its own unique beauty, still the notes are something in themselves, which something is not a mere function of their position in the symphony, and this intrinsic or internal quality they possess by virtue of their worth as individuals, as ends not simply as means, to the One.
Now we have not here split the meaning of property into two contradictory halves. In both cases, a predicate of a thing is an expression of its value to the whole,4 but in the one case of its intrinsic value, since it is valued and loved as an end; and in the other of its extrinsic value, as a means to the formation of a whole which is a1so [153] valued or loved.
True, intrinsic value could not be in isolation from such a whole. We can be loved only because we have a sphere in which to act in a fashion worthy of such regard — but our own subjective motives, our inner life thus expressing itself, has its immediate and inwardly centralized character5 and worth, on our view, essentially, in one aspect, worth to the Divine.
On the other hand, we may be valued together with other objects which, while not affecting our inner life or reality, still contribute with us to form a value —whole of some sort. From this arises our external relations.
The sum of our defense here then is that if the property of a thing is in any case to be something not located within the thing, then in all cases property must be relational to another, and not confined simply to the thing itself. Our Value-relation appears to us to be a relation which can account for both an internal and an external or environmental character of a thing without losing its own unity or identity of character as the root meaning of the concept of predicate or property.
(2) In regard to the regress, we observe that this encumbrance falls upon the pluralist because, reducing [154] that which relates to the relation, he has, to be sure, something to relate things, but no room for any such entity or operation as this actual relating of the things by the relation.
This third entity falls between the relation and the thing, requiring farther relations to bring all together into the one result of the thing related by R. But the regress also arises because of the impossibility of giving a consistent meaning to the notion of external property in a philosophy for which predicates are essentially and absolutely self-enclosed and private possessions of the entities to which they apply. Externality here leaves us without recourse save to go on endlessly affirming a relation of ownership between two perfectly separate things — each affirmation being inadmissible on the premisses, but stubbornly reasserting itself, — “but the thing just is related and that’s the end of it. Relations are indefinable, and being related is an indefinable unity of thing and relations.” So says Russell. But if a unity of things is not a relation between them nor yet a monistic pervading principle, a one in them as a many, it is nothing.6 Hence the second relation, and the rest of the self-generating series, are validly inferred by the Monist. We must therefore endeavor to escape this dilemma by employing our own principles.
On the other hand, conceiving relation not as a function which performs itself, but as a performance that includes the object in its own [155] being, we have no third entity — the actual relating7 to arise between the relation and the thing and thus generate further relations in an endless series. For us, what relates is the One, and what it makes real when it relates is a relation. The actual relating is what grips the things, and a given relation such as “between” is an abstracted concept of a certain manner of relating — as blueness is an abstracted aspect of a visual experience. Now if such logical abstractions are necessary to the world, are elements in it, then “between” for example is involved in relating two things in that fashion. But at least the fashion does not relate, the actual relating, characterized by the fashion as its quality, is what holds the object in its grip — and this real relating is simply a function of the living Ultimate One. Now, it can be urged, we have still the three entitles — the object, the “relation” or kind of relating, and the relating (which is inseparable from the supreme Relator.) Must not these elements be related together? It seems we can only reply in the affirmative. But our defense remains, as follows. The One Life differentiates itself, not in terms of concepts external to it, but in terms of its own self-differentiations as an ultimate fact. In our own experience this principle appears. I do not have to resort to a concept somewhere outside me in order to experience sugar as sweet.
The differentiation of my consciousness into a particular pleasant sensation is not [156] (on our view at least) a product of bringing a logical essence, namely pleasantness, into my experience. The diversification of experience is in terms of experience, of meaning to the self, and difference of meaning is itself a meaning and springs from the one principle of mind as the creator of meaning and of all diversity.
On this view betweenness is not something over and above actual relatings. It is simply one more actual relating or comparison between relatings. The fact of a relation is just the relating, in a given way to be sure, but such character or quality is a meaning self-differentiated in the actual being of the relating — not an external tertium quid — or else it is a result of a comparison afterward for a further purpose of classification.
We may remark further upon the regress, perhaps more clearly by observing that if to know is to value, then to experience the value of things is to grasp them completely, and therefore, even if it seems clear that between A and the relating of A by the One a relation can be predicated, and so on indefinitely, still it is not clear that the value of A or of anything else in any sense appears in such a series except perhaps in the potential infinity of further self-relations always involved in the life of mind at any point. Therefore we say, grasp A’s direct and indirect worth to the One and its indirect worth and you grasp the full truth.
[157] Because, in discursive predication (always but a surveying of an area of truth with a view to further possession, not that possession in full itself) thought can go on and affirm relation after relation between term and relation, since if it remains silent to a repeated question: is there any such relation? — its silence being taken as denial the bond between term and relation thus becomes severed. But the point seems to be that the mind in saying — the thing is related — has fully stated the bond implied, as simply an aspect of the relating which includes the thing in its own being as a Unity respective of differences. To raise the question of the inclusion of the thing in the relation is simply to ask all over again — was the thing held to be related or not? The relating is of course related to the thing, because ultimately the relating is the Reality which self-relates itself to all things — and for things to be and to be held in this self-relation are two aspects of the same fact.8 There is at any rate no gulf between related and relator which an infinite series alone could even pretend to cross. When you have said the thing is, you have already predicated the supreme Relating of it, and have no individual as so just in itself on one side and an equally separate Relation on the other. For this reason our defense of relation as gripping the object at once or the first time so to speak, no matter how many further relations may be invented as further differentiations of the unitary and living bond [158] first asserted, is not a defense open in the same manner to our pluralistic opponent.
For he starts with things which have their being as individuals with no essential reference to the relations called upon to relate them — and hence to say that the object is once for all gripped by the relation is an assertion in contradiction with the premiss that what the Relation is or does has no essential bearing on the object as that particular object. For nothing is implied by the reality or self-identity of the thing but the thing itself, at any rate the external Relation is not so implied, and, hence what the relation is or does can have nothing to do with what the term is or has as its predicates. The relation can relate, but this has no power to compel the term to get related. Any state or achievement of the relation cannot imply anything with reference to the object, because to imply9 is to include as part of the meaning or character of a thing. It means, there cannot be the one without the other — e.g., if the relation relates the term, it cannot be that the term is not related, does not possess the relation. But if one cannot be without the other the one is obviously a part of the other, otherwise it cannot be inseparable from it. Such an separate inseparability requires a link which repeats the problem.
* * *
[[Note: there follows a passage, bracketed by Hartshorne, that runs from page 159 to 163 in the typewritten manuscript. His reason for doing this is explained in Endnote 10. — HyC]]
[159]
10 [No account of such an ultimate question as relations can be fully free from difficulties. But we hold to the view given as avoiding a contraction in respect to the meaning of “predicate,” and as avoiding an endless regress to a degree we may once more summarize as follows:
1. The notion of truth as grasp of value enables us to say that a series of relations between the term and the relation is untrue because no addition to the apprehension of value — while the initial relation was essential to this apprehension. On the other hand this series is true in the sense that, if you raise the question of the further relations it is essential and valuable to reply in the affirmative; but the fullest possession of the significance of the situation was already had prior to the question, which therefore can be dropped at any point.
2. On the other hand, for the pluralist, the absolute independence of the being of A and that which is to relate it, leads to an endless series precisely because the predication of R and A has to bring two entities not already essentially related into relation so that the duplication of R by R is the result of an attempt to get any truth out of the original assertion at all. For that assertion does nothing if it does not bring two elements, A and R, not before so related, into connection and relation with each other. This relation of relating or being related is a new entity between A and R, so that instead of the [160] unity which we seek we have simply increased the number of elements from two to three.
We can only say of the teleological Monistic view that it begins with A-related-by-the One, and in affirming a specific relation of A simply specifies the manner of the bond between A and its Ground; that, having started with unity in diversity as ultimate it does not face the hopeless task of uniting simply separate entities by means of relations which are more separate entities and merely increase the problem by calling to be connected with things as their relations without however being anything to the things by virtue of any logical bond between the state of a relation and the state of a thing. Each being what it is simply in itself nothing of either can be a property of the other, but at most can be in relation to that other. The regress is no gratuitous creation but the direct result of seeking to avoid the contradictions of a property which is not a property, and a kind of being-related which itself must do the relating. Once admit that any R, e.g., “between” is what relates A and B, and yet could be itself if it did not relate them, and you are asserting either a possible change in the internal state of R which change is to actually include A (the “relating of A”) or else a possible change in the relation between A and R. This dilemma, and the contradiction of the purely external property appear as plainly ruinous, whatever difficulties may beset an opposing view.
[161] Our own interpretation appears preferable both because it falls into no such manifest and unmitigated inconsistencies, and because it is more faithful to the empirical fact that all known relations are known as mediated by the unity of experience — in which a “this” or individual is always a this (actually or conceivably) given object, individual for us in virtue of this presence or relation to mind and under-going external relations only because of the preservation throughout of one constant relation of the following attention and recollection of mind — as the principle of individuality or identity in difference.
Thus, if it is said, as by Professor Spaulding (The New Rationalism, p. 181) or Professor Sheldon (Strife of Systems, etc.) that the empirical evidence seems wanting for the Underlying Reality view of relations; or even, as Professor Spaulding holds, that the empirical disproof of this theory is “remarkably easy,” the answer is clear — as we have already indicated. If the difference between a related and a not-related is not in a, nor yet in R (since if it were a in the one case must become part of R, nor yet a different relation between a and R because of the futility of answering a question by repeating it), where is it to be, — where, in experience is it found to be? The only answer is, in terms of the total situation as a pattern, as in spite of its multiplicity, possessed of a unity of character of its own. Relations change for us when the experience-[162]whole becomes altered and a partially new one takes its place. But if, to supply any room for difference between a related and a not related, we have to adduce a difference between two wholes, it is clear that we cannot conceptually construct such wholes out of mere independent entities (some of which are called relations). We might say that the becoming related of a and b by R is the appearance of a Rb, its coming into being in place of a not (Rb). But (1) we thus introduce Being as something which can be altered, can register in terms of a difference to itself the getting or being related of a and b. The relatedness thus is to get its meaning from the coming to be of a complex, not vice versa. So that we need, over and above terms be related a Being to register the rise of the complex whose being is the relatedness. We suggest that empirically, experience itself indisputably is such a unitary register. To conceive something as corning into being is to conceive it as coming into an experience — psychologically, at least, this would seem an empirical fact. (2) The coming to be of a R b clearly cannot be conceived without conceiving the being related of a and b in manner R. Hence this difference of being-related must be conceived in another fashion than as the mere appearance of a complex. It must in short, be conceived as an act or life which holds the things together in itself and measures the difference in terms of the difference in terms of the difference made to itself — not as a mere [163] complex but as a single self-identifying principle. You cannot say that mind does not do this in experience without simply assuming the atomistic view of mind.] [[ Note: the passage bracketed by Hartshorne ends here. — HyC]]
* * *
Finally we may instance a representative objection to the Underlying Reality or Monistic view of relations. The objection is expressed by Professor Spaulding thus: (The New Rationalism, pp. 187-188) “If a first U is found to mediate the relation between a and non-a, then, since this U is related to the complex, a R non-a another U is in turn implied to mediate this relation, and so on in infinite series. Therefore, either an ultimate underlying U is never reached, or, if it is, then, although it is related to the complex of the preceding complexes, this relation does not demand an underlying reality to mediate it. But, if there is this one exception, the no relation need demand an underlying entity to mediate it, and the whole theory falls to the ground.”
This objection could only be made by a mind not actually conceiving the theory held by its opponents at all. If a relation is required between U and a R non-a, this relation needs no further underlying reality — U’ to mediate it. For it has neither been admitted nor proved that U cannot be conceived as self-relating, as mediating its own relations. Certainly in no other way does the monist regard his U. Professor Spaulding has fallen into the fallacy of conceiving U as simply another entity [164] “along side of” a and R; whereas, by hypothesis, U underlies a and R and therefore is its own mediator of relations between itself and a and R. Once more we beg to repeat: U can constitute the relations of a and R because it constitutes all their predicates, because the latter have in all cases a face of meaning turned toward the One, and whatever they are that they must be for the latter. To seek the truth about a is simply to seek an apprehension of what a is to the One. Obviously, with respect to an external property we must look beyond a to find such truth about it. But if beyond a, we cannot look to b or c. For these too do not own the R in question. We have left two alternatives. We can inquire as to the relation between R and a, whatever relation we suggest then becoming the problem exactly at its starting point — an unresolved contradiction between “property of” and “not property of.” Or else we can regard truth about a, b, c, etc., as essentially what these are to One Universal Standard Register, or Ground, of all truth and all being. A relation of a may then be external to a in the sense that it does not alter it as a contributor of direct value, but only as a contributor of indirect or — as it were instrumental value.
* * *
[[Note: A passage follows, bracketed by Hartshorne, that goes from page 164 to page 167 in the typewritten manuscript. His reason for doing this is explained in Endnote 11. — HyC]]
11 [The conclusion then is that while we do not contest the view that “externality and relationality are compatible” we deny that they are compatible if externality means the [165] complete self-enclosure of terms, so that predicates are either purely privately owned or else not owned at all.
In short we deny that relations can be external unless there is a mediating Reality containing all predicates of the thing, internal or external.
On the valuational Monistic view we define all properties as modes of relatedness — i.e., of worth to the Mediating or All-relating Being — and thus to think a thing and to think it as related are not two things but one. The only question is how we are to conceive the thing to be related by the One to itself. We conceive this as falling into two types of relatedness — intrinsic value, and value as contributing to a complex itself of intrinsic value. In both cases “predicate” means — so related by the One, never imagining or pretending that things can truly be thought except as “in God” as elements-in-the-Divine Life and Plan, we have not to add or attach (i.e., relate) things as self-enclosed entities, to their relations as things additional to the being of things. The being of things, their very thinghood is for us to be thought or known solely by a partial possession in our own experience of the Divine Realization of the values things have to it, and to predicate relations is just to endeavor to fix and dwell upon aspects of the complete and embracing significant Life of which, as ultimate unity, things are essentially elements in or sharers of. Thus we have in the mere things no such [166] the inclusive reality of that which relates them, and to note the manner of such relating, is one with a recording of the status of things as having being at all. On the other side, since what relates, in this particular relating as in all cases, includes the thing related in the relating itself, so that the latter as a particular real relation or bond uniting the thing with another, is essentially the relating-of-the-thing, inclusive of it, and so requiring no further link to bring the two in connection. The pluralist met his regress owing to the fact that what relates is for him something which could be itself if it did not relate, as the thing likewise could be itself without the relating entity. The regress is justly inferred because thing and relation exclude each other in their respective realities or essential natures. Hence to predicate one of another is to connect them by a further bond or new relation. Things admitted conceivable without essential relation or overlapping of being, cannot be properties of each other without introducing a relation between them, which for the pluralist can only be a third self-enclosed factor, not essentially related to the first two, and so thought of as acquiring a (fourth) relation for the special occasion in question. The bond between two things, or their relation, being what it is equally when it does or does not relate them, only an external change in its status relatively to, or by another relation connecting it with, the things constitute it a [167] relation actually relating them.] [[The passage bracketed by Hartshorne ends here — HyC]]
With us, to repeat it once more and finally, we face no such equivocal definition of property as either what the thing is, or includes in its being, or in other cases as something the thing is not, or excludes from its being. For, to Monism, the being of the thing is a phase of the One Life, and as such can include predicates as relations of worth of two types, both expressing the common meaning denoted to the word property of value to the One Being. And secondly, we avoid the regress inasmuch as the actual relation or bond between things is essentially, in a given case, the relation-of-those-things, an activity of the one internally qualified by and inclusive of, the things, so that we do not need to add or relate the bond to the things, by the aid of a new relation, but regard the thought of the relation as the thought of a unity already in itself including the things as elements.12 From the side of the thing, correspondingly, to think the thing is to think it as included necessarily and as an aspect not different from its being as a thing, in a relating activity. Specific “relations” are but proclamations or labels of an appreciation of the manner in which the relating Life actually deals with the thing, and so endows it with relational predicates.
B. Internal Relations.
The subject of internal relations is so exceedingly elusive and also so complex and far-reaching in its ramifications, that — inasmuch as pluralism in the main is accustomed to rely upon the externalist view, we omit any effort to supply a demonstration for the Monistic thesis under the present heading. We merely observe that our view does not depend upon the assumption or theory of internalism, inasmuch as we are able to conceive external relations in Monistic terms. The character of the individual as of unique value to the One does not seem to us to depend upon all his relations but only upon some, such as his social relations with other individuals.
Whether this view can be maintained against all objections is too formidable a question to be considered here.
Conclusion to Section 9.
Externalism we have seen to imply the Monistic Thesis. The latter moreover does not rest upon the assertion that all relations are internal, whether or not it implies this view as a consequence. We have only been able to say, in the limits of the present work, that we do not see the consequence as necessary.
In concluding the present section we may recall that [169] in the discussion under argument the doctrine of relations as interpreted in Monistic terms was defended against the accusation of an endless regress in any fatal sense. For we urged, first, that the relation was conceived as essentially an aspect of the One Life, and as such inclusive in its being of the object — so that in conceiving the relation we already have it as relating the object, and not as a merely separate entity requiring a further relation to relate it to the object. In the second place, the object was seen as essentially a something related by the relating Activity, the predicating of a particular relation thus being merely the specifying of the phase this constitutive relating assumes.13 And finally, we urged that for us truth is the apprehension of the value of things, and we found that a realization of a value-relation of an object is not in the least enhanced by multiplying relations between term and the relation. For us truth is not at the last a matter of propositions but of possession, enjoyment, or harmony. From this point of view whatever regress remains uneliminated by the account offered of a relation as mediated by the Ultimate Being, is seen as no part of the truth of things as tested by the criterion of adequacy of value-revelation.
In all respects then, Valuational Monism appeared to avoid the difficulties encountered by the pluralist or at least the pluralist as external relationist.
——————————
Endnotes
1. Or in the two objects taken together. The result is well indicated by Von Hartmann: “Die Beziehung gehört aber zweitens auch nicht der Summe beider Objecte an, weil eine solche Summe . . . selbst schon eine Beziehung ist, in welche die objecte durch das Denken gesetzt werden.” Kategorienlehre. Leipzig. 1896. p. 173.
2. Common to all minds.
3. This kind of relation is what is usually spoken of as the relation — but the real link or bond connecting things has this kind as its quality or description, but is itself that which has the quality — i.e., a genuine individual portion of reality, an instance of “between” and not between as such.
4. I.e., all predicates are relational, and reflect themselves beyond the privacy of the thing.
5. Which is not necessarily changed by every change in the world however distant, — so we suppose as at least a reasonable view.
6. Cf. Bradley: “On the one side . . . a strict pluralism in which nothing is admissible beyond simple terms and external relations. On the other . . . unities which are complex and which cannot be analyzed into terms and relations” (since declared indefinable). Essays, 281.
7. Since the relating is here real only as a relating-of-the-thing — needs no attaching to the thing because it already in part is the thing.
8. On the view that relations must be given up altogether see Bradley, Appearance, p. 33, and Cf. Hartmann: “Alles Sein ist Bezogensein, selbst das Uebersein des Absoluten, das über Dasein und Bewusstsein hinausleigt, aber eben darin sein Sein, hat dass es über und hinter diesen, d.h. zu ihnen in Beziehung ist. Mit dem Beziehen hört alles Reden und Denken auf; der Rest ist gedankenloses Schweigen. Dort das Sein zu suchen, wäre Thorheit.” Hartmann, Kategorienlehre, p. 178. Cf. also Ruggiero.
9. No other conception of implication is of any aid to the pluralist here. At most he must bring in “Truth,” as the mediating One after all required for any account of relations.
10. This restatement (to page 163) may appear unnecessary.
11. Bracketed passage (to p. 167) is unnecessary if the Section so far has made itself intelligible.
12. So that a change in external relations is simply a change in the continuum or relating life in which things are held or included — which inclusion coincides with their being.
13. In other words to conceive an object is to conceive an object — of a general value-relation to the One. This relation includes extrinsic values. That it should do so is a part of the being of the object. Hence the thought of the external relations is not an addition to the idea of the being of the object but merely the exact determination of it.