The Unity of Being
Part II Section 6
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Section 6
The Argument from the Category of Being
Argument 1. Thesis: Whatever “Being” may be, all things are related to this something by a relation which is indispensable or internal to them, and which alone renders them other than nothing.
Whether “to be” denotes membership in a class simply, or the actual possession of a universal element or principle identical in all things, it is certain that without this membership or this possession, or some relation or other to Being, no entity can be — or differ in the least from nothing (even a merely possible object has being as such — there is such a possibility).
It may be protested: but a thing might be, by itself, and in no relation to any Being common to it and other things. Now in this hypothesis it is clearly supposed that the “to be,” in the case of the thing which is to be just in and of itself, has something in common with “to be” as applied to the actual case of a world in which there are a number of things. For otherwise the supposition of there being just one thing rather than of there being many, becomes a comparison of two situations of being in which the word has totally different meanings and so becomes useless and contradictory.
We conclude, then, that except in relation to one and the same Being, or that which is predicated by the words to [100] be, a thing is simply the opposite of a thing and equal to nothing. It can have no qualities, except as there are such qualities: all that it is and has is possible only by virtue of a relation to Being which it can not be thought apart from and still be thought in any other way than as nothing. Given a thing and its qualities, except as we think that (either as an actuality or as an actual possibility) there is such a thing and such qualities, we are not framing any judgment which could possibly be true or false, and we are conceiving no object to be anything in particular. We are not in short really thinking — as Parmenides declared.
Thus the relation to Being alone separates an object from sheer non-entity. No trace of quality is conceivable except as term to the relation in question. The latter thus becomes a manifestly and a supremely “internal” relation. It contributes not merely a necessary part of the thing or entity, but contributes all parts. The difference between the thing with its being and the thing quite without it is the difference between all that the thing is and zero or nothing. The relatedness to Being thus is qualitatively adequate to the entire nature of the thing and is or at least reproduces that entire nature.
At the very least we can reject the view of Reality or of the Universe, as a mere externally related collection. For with each thing there is a relation to Being which is all that the thing is — a relation which by imparting [101] relatedness to being imparts all quality or nature. No quality conceived in any way prior to this relation, is really conceived as anything at all.
The further implications of the internality of the Being-Relation are developed In the next Argument.
Argument 2. Thesis: Since the difference between the being of a thing and its entire non-being or unrelatedness to Being, is equivalent to all that the thing in any way is, the nature of the thing must be conceived as expressible in terms of the nature of the relation.
Think the thing as having being, and you think it in whatever nature it has. Think it as out of relation to being, and you are thinking it as a mere word for the absence of anything or as nothing. The difference between the being-related and the not-being related to Being is the full measure of what the thing is. The only way one can fail to see this is to persist in imagining that we can conceive the thing in its character without troubling about their being such a thing. The point is, there must at least be such a character — or our thought is only of itself as bare thought and is identical with infinite indeterminateness of thought, a meaning which means nothing, and so is nonsense. And so, if we are to know ourselves to be thinking any character we must know it in some way to be, as a definite object of our thought, in short we must [102] think the relation to Being. Remove this relation and you remove all.
The strict implication, then, seems quite safely to be that as we have said, the relation to Being in so relating a thing endows it with its entire nature, this entire nature being, (as it is) quite absent and nullified without the relation. If the relatedness thus produced is to supply the entire quality of the term related, clearly it must derive this quality from itself and include it in itself in terms of its own reality or nature. For any other reality turns out to be itself anything only through its relatedness to Being; so that in the end all qualities are equivalent to the variety of relatedness-to-Being. Not to the variety of things related-to-Being; for the nature of each of these is measured by its relatedness and not vice versa. There is no opportunity to characterize a thing apart and then to attach the relation. The relation is thought from the beginning and in specifying its term one simply specifies what the relation bestows upon the term as its very all.
Let us consider it from another angle. The difference between the thing’s being, (i.e., having relation to being) and its not standing in any relation to being, must make a difference to something, be real for thought as a difference somehow. Any proposition of which the opposite is mere non-sense, is itself nonsense. Now, the difference here [103] in question cannot be made to the thing. For the thing here, upon one of the two alternatives, vanishes altogether and is nothing. The difference between nothing and the thing is made very well to the mind viewing the situation — in the one case its concept of thing reaches an object, in the other it loses itself in the void of indetermination and nescience. But this fact is no help to the realistic pluralist, at any rate, who must consider “being” as in no essential way dependent upon mind. The difference in question, then, for him cannot lie in a difference to the thing. It can only lie then in a difference to the relation. The entire difference between the thing and nothing becomes represented in terms of the relation itself and its own nature. Thus the Being-relation is shown to contain all qualities somehow in terms of its own quality or resources. Different characters must be fully paralleled or mirrored by the different relations to Being and their characters.
Argument 3. Thesis: Considering all entities as members of the class of things having Being, and a class as constituted by a relation of similarity between its members (Professor Spaulding’s view) all members of the class Being are seen to be similar in an aspect which in the case of any member, includes all its aspects.
This is manifestly the case, if our previous dis-[104]cussion is at all sound. And obviously the Being of a thing cannot be regarded as merely one aspect among others — but rather must be admitted to register and account for and even to contribute all: inasmuch as the removal of this aspect is one with the removal of all.
Argument 4. Thesis: The various forms of relation to Being (or the various Being-Relations) themselves have Being and nature only in terms of the nature of Being itself.
These relations, with their relatings which are one with the bestowal of reality and character to the things related, are of course items in Being, are qualified by “is” as much as the objects whose nature and being they make possible. Shall we therefore relate the relations to Being, and if so through themselves, or through further relations? The latter course appears futile owing to the directly necessitated regress. The former course implies that a relation is somehow capable of being distinct from itself, as both a relation and a term related by that relation. Thus there must be the relations of identity and of distinction uniting the relation as relating itself, and the relation as related by itself. But the relations of identity and distinction repeat the same problem. The original relation must stand at both ends of the relation of identity — or there is no relating. No doubt in logic a thing may be called identical with itself — but only [105] because the mind taking the thing over again, can oppose the thing as taken once and as taken or considered a second time. The identity is relative to a difference introduced by the mental function of comparison and reconsideration. Aside from such a function for one thing to be related to itself or by itself is nonsense, and destroys all meaning to the idea of unity or oneness.1
In any case, if the Being-Relation derives its being from its self-relation to Being, then this self-relation must have being, and once more we appear not to have put the matter correctly, since the only meaning our words seem to bear is self-destroying unless an endless process be viewed as carried to completion.
The only mode of escape from such a consequence is thus to view the Being-Relations as essentially aspects of the very nature or reality of the One Being itself. For then we are recognizing that in conceiving the Being-Relations of things, and so their essence and reality, we are really conceiving elements within the One Being, or manifestations of its all-embracing power, life, or reality. Need we then relate these manifestations to Being by further relations in an endless chain? We reply, no: for we have now admitted the presence of the One as the very being of all things, a single and universal principle which needs [106] no chain of relations to itself because — on our view — its essence is the self-relation, or self-realizing power of a spontaneous and self-sustained life.
Since its relations are internal to it and conceived as partial conceptions of it, in thinking them at all we have thought their presence to Being, and there are no two separate items to be connected: the Being-relation, and its own Being or relation to Being. By relation-to-Being we mean a function of Being, not something over and above the encircling life of Being, and requiring connection with it. Connection with Being is one with actual participation or dwelling within Being. If we think at all we think the One and everything else essentially as meaning for the One, as one glimpse into its life of meaning and value. Never pretending to think something external to Being we face neither a futile chain of relations suspended in this externality of non-Being between the external something and Being itself; nor on the other hand (and this is our main point), do we face the contradiction of a relation endowing its terms with all reality and yet regarded as a mere empty abstraction or link, without internal possession, in terms of its own inherent quality, of the natures of things, and of the power to create, or in good faith to stand as the inclusive basis of the potentiality of all natures.
A truly concrete Universal Being alone can relate itself to objects in a manner capable of characterizing them, of registering the [107] difference between their being and their not-being, and of standing as the complete ground of its possibility. A relation wholly internal, as we have shown the Being-Relation to be, is really a contradiction unless it is a creative relation — one capable of producing the object. For to declare that we can conceive the object as other than nothing only by conceiving it in a certain relation, is to say that in that relation lies the very essence of the thing, and therefore the relation has only to be in order for the thing to be.
But a relation to a thing which contains the essence of the thing is precisely that creative relation which according to the Theologians is the same act in the original creation of a being as in its constant maintenance in Being. The nature of the thing is derived from the nature and power of the Ultimate Being which contains all capabilities and all riches within itself.
The essential inconsistency, then, of which we accuse pluralism is its pretension that “being,” in the ultimate reference or root-meaning of that term, is a mere abstract universal: something, that is, essentially thin, or barren, or empty in character, while on the other hand no account of the situation can avoid or obviate the fact that all that is concrete, or rich, or explicit, is all this only by virtue of a relation to the emptiness of the universal in question. If these two propositions do not [108] destroy each other — do not hopelessly conflict — no one at least has been able to detect and to point out what there is in one which is consistent with anything in the other. And the second of the two is indubitable — “to be” is certainly utterly fundamental to all that can be said to be. The first therefore may with the best of reasons be abandoned..
As for the idea that a universal capable of so many forms must therefore be formless, — or, again, a mere abstraction, — the proper reply is that if the capacity to assume all forms implies complete indifference to form, then such a universal must be quite without any character or meaning at all; and that, on the contrary the true assumption is that that which can take or constitute the being of many forms, is that which is capable of assuming form, not as limitation, or in a manner exclusive of other forms, but as self-determination or possession, expressing its infinite and ever identical power in a variety of manifestations all of which fall within its embracing life of significance or value, and the maintenance of each of which is no bar to the maintenance and possession of a vast variety of others.
Such a concrete Universal can with manifest consistency be regarded as that which, in terms of an internal relation to itself, can characterize and register the being and nature of all things — represent the meaning of the proposition — “There is such and such a thing.”
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Argument 5. Thesis: The same as above. If we pass from a consideration of individual entities to a survey of the world or Universe, we find the same implication. Describe the whole in all its nature and interrelations and there still seems a residual factor in the ascription of being or there — isness to the whole. “There is such a whole.” What does it mean for the whole to be? This seems to denote some relation within the whole — yet a relation by which alone the whole is anything, one which must be thought in thinking of the whole at all. Take this relation as one of whole to a part or parts and we reply: that there is such a whole so related to its parts is clearly more than just the relation which the whole in fact has to its parts. If it is a relation of the whole to itself we deny the meaning or consistency of such a self-relation, — as argued out above.
The only escape from these paradoxes is to admit that the being of the whole is a mirror in which every item of the whole, including its wholeness, is registered, and which itself has being in its being-for-self as a self- reflecting Mind. To ask what is, would thus be to ask what the Ultimate Interest, in terms of worth to which we ourselves have being, possesses in the full scope of its life, of values. To predicate Being of this ultimate Interest is to proclaim it as the final reference or meaning of the [110] word “is,”2 as, in its infinite self-reality, precisely Being itself, which forever is in its eternal self-realization. In knowing that the One is the very Principle or immanent Ground of our existence, we know all we want to know in asking if an Ultimate Being exists.
On a monistic or immanentist view this is perfectly consistent; on an ultimate pluralism it is on the contrary fatal to declare that the Being of the world is its relation to the mind thinking it. On the latter view all becomes pendent from the one mind, or internally related to it, and the pluralism vanishes. On the former, since the One is immanent in all minds, the relativity of Being to any experience which raises the question — what is? — turns out to be only a relativity to the One which is immanent in that mind as sustaining it in being — i.e., in its own Life. “God is” is seen to mean: that ultimate principle in terms of which I am real, and all else likewise is real, is divine and Perfect. Or, it means: in beholding anything, I am beholding phases of one Power, which is real to itself with an infinite fullness, and of which my knowledge of reality is but the slightest of glimpses; a power which [111] sustains all things, and which I actually embrace and possess in myself in a degree capable conceivably of indefinite increase.
No more could be intended by the existence of God. And the universe receives its definition of Being, as the total wealth and system of values in the Divine Life. We are driven to no endless regress in the direction of the being of the Being of the One, etc., For the self-reality of the One is the single all-inclusive register both of the One and all things else and is present in my questioning as the immanent Meaning of my word “is.”3 To know that a thing is, is merely to discover what that Meaning as the One Self-Existent Life involves. Knowing what it involves, the question is answered.
In short, if “what is” is rendered equivalent — as Bosanquet suggests — to “what is affirmed by thought,” — ultimately by one Thinker everywhere involved in thought, then this Thinker Himself, since he affirms or recognizes Himself by an intrinsic and eternal Self-Realization or enjoyment, may be viewed as having Being in terms of the same register of Reality, upon which all other instances of “is” are inscribed.
On a pluralistic view no such genuine self-reflection which reflects all things else, is to be found, and hence we are left with no real answer to the paradox of a universe which besides all its qualities, is with those qualities — the “is” thus falling forever outside, and yet remaining [112] within as the most essential factor of all.
For Monism the “is” of the Divine Life with all it includes is, once more, the self-reflection which at the same time reflects all. The “is” of the whole with all its qualities becomes then not something above them, but their indwelling Life. There is no need to consider it as anything extra, and yet also as wholly essential; but just as it is essential so it is wholly intrinsic and all-pervading, and, in truth, the very essence of things. Either you admit Being to thus permeate things and reflect and register itself and all things at once, or you are left forever with it as something over and above things, and then something over and above itself: and as a thing among things, yet essential to and constitutive of things.
Argument 6. If Existence be regarded as prior to Being, then Existence becomes our concrete Monistic Universal.
The difference between my existence and my non-existence cannot be essentially a difference to me. For in the second case I am not to be found at all “on the view of being as essentially located in time” and can register no difference. One can only say that “existence” or the realm of existence, or the world-whole, undergoes a. certain determinate change. Thus we get the whole, or some universal principle of reality, as constitutive of, and as measuring in its own terms, my entire being and nature — the [113] difference between it and its sheer absence.
We may observe here that if mind is regarded as irreducible to entities non-mental or independent of mind, then the world-whole, or “existence,” must be a spiritual unity or principle — and materialism or agnosticism fall. This point however depends upon the problem of the nature of mind (discussed in Section 11).
The present argument meets those who neglect Being-as-such and regard things as parts of the world-requiring no tie or tag of “is” to trouble us. They still reduce things to essentially parts of the whole, and one form of Monism at least appears. The problem of the existence of the world as a whole, over and above its nature, still remains. Plus all qualities, things and relations, we have one more thing — their existence. For spiritual monism this means that all things are essentially reflected into a final self-reflector, this relation of reflecting not being, another entity additional to things but their indwelling all constitutive life. But any mere link or non-constitutive relation is just one more thing to be given being.
7. Conclusion. We conclude as follows. At least we know that Being is a one something the relation to which of having being is wholly internal to all things, Internal relations then exist. Secondly we feel justified in concluding that a relation without which a thing is nothing, is manifestly that which endows it with all that it has.
[114] In the relation is the entire measure of the thing. The concreteness of the relation becomes evident. Since the relation clearly derives its being from Being itself, the latter is seen to be a wholly concrete principle in the end. Its alleged abstractness means only the meagerness of our grasp of it. If more it contradicts the constitutive character of the relation.
From another point of view — a relation which makes its object must be a creative relation. A relation without which its term is literally nothing is a contradiction unless the thing is all that it is by virtue of the relation. Concreteness falls again to the Universal.
Finally, whatever Being may be, Being itself is, and we get a self-relation which is a contradiction of identity unless the essence of the thing is in the relations of identity and of difference by which it is divided, not as by relations which are entities over and above the thing (thus breaking it into bits) but are its own inner self-contrasting and relating life. Thus Being sweeps the relations of identity and difference into itself, destroying its unity, or else compelling us to view it as essentially a self-reflecting process, in terms of which all identity and difference must be conceived. Otherwise we have being disrupted by relations which are essential elements of it and yet external to or other than its own [115] nature. Once more we are led to mind as such a self-contrasting process.
Final Statement. We might perhaps put the issue in this ultimate compact form. One cannot predicate being of a thing (as one entity or element, of another) for unless one has already in thinking the thing, thought its being, one has thought nothing. For the same reason, things cannot be predicated of being. All that remains to do is to admit that things are, as objects of thought, other than being only in the sense of constituting various expressions or differentiations of the principle of being itself; so that what may be predicated are various elements-of-being, defined in terms of this relation and predicated of being as the universal identity for and in terms of the nature of which the things are what they are. A relation without which a thing is just nothing must contain all that a thing is in terms of its own being.
And since the relation to Being is also literally nothing without Being itself, the nature of Being measures and contains in itself the differences separating all things from zero or a blank nothing. The concreteness and constitutive character of Being is only avoided by the contradiction of maintaining that that in which all is contained (since subtracting it we get no remainder) is nevertheless empty or a mere abstraction. If in thought to remove something from a thing is by logical necessity to remove all, then by an equal logical necessity [116] that something must be all that the thing is. And since the relation to Being is nothing without Being, Being itself as the identical or real meaning of “to be” must be all that all things are — must be infinitely concrete and utterly all-embracing.
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Endnotes
1. See Bradley, Essays, p. 283.
2. For the realist such an escape from the regress would imply a relativity of all being to a human meaning. For the immanentist the ultimate meaning involved or indicated is always the Universal or Divine Self-Meaning. We begin with an “is” or register of fact which includes all things in its identity and not only is what it is, but, with all its quality, is or has being in its being — itself for itself — in its self-reflection. If, again one should say, given what a thing is you are given that it is, or its being — still that and what are clearly not identical — the “is” is something left over the quality.
3. Self-consciousness as self-realization or self-enjoyment is not two halves of a mind in relation but an ultimate inwardly illuminated life — the relating or self-reflection is the essence of its nature.